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In the normal course of
business dealings, banks, commercial
firms, individuals, and even countries
become interlinked in many ways. For
example, banks enter financial contracts
(such as interest rate swaps and forward
contracts) with one another, individuals
invest in the same stock, or firms provide
credit to one another.
While everyone in the
examples above clearly benefits from
such linkages — otherwise, they
inks between firms, individuals, or countries
are more common in this age of computers
and global interdependence. While such
links benefit participants, a tightly
interconnected marketplace also has a downside:
Problems at one firm can be quickly transmitted to
others in a process economists call contagion. The
possibility of contagion has led many people to worry
about excessive linkages among financial institutions.
In this article, Yaron Leitner describes how contagion
can occur, explains why the threat of contagion is not
necessarily a bad thing, and shows why some firms may
choose to bail out other firms that are facing financial
problems.
wouldn’t have entered into contracts in
the first place — there is a downside to
a tightly interconnected marketplace.
Problems at one firm can be quickly
transmitted to others in a process
economists call contagion.
The negative effects of
contagion have led many people to
worry about “excessive” linkages among
financial institutions. Whether this
concern is valid is an open question.
In this article, I will discuss
some examples of the ways in which
linkages can lead to contagion.
Interestingly, these linkages may also
lead to private-sector bailouts where
one firm is rescued by other firms
linked to it to prevent the spread of
crisis. Webster’s dictionary defines
“bailout” as a “rescue from financial
distress.” Usually this word carries
negative connotations because people
associate financial distress with the
misbehavior of firms’ managers and
assume that the bailout will require
taxpayers’ funds. But financial distress
can also occur as a result of bad luck,
and bailouts (for example, the ones
discussed in this paper) need not
necessarily involve public money.
Therefore, in this article I will use the
word bailout without any pre-judgment.
In particular, I will show that inter-
dependence may improve private
incentives to provide insurance in the
form of private-sector bailouts and that
this may sometimes be beneficial both to
individuals and to society as a whole.
I will also explain why the
threat of contagion is not necessarily a
bad thing and examine some of the
tradeoffs involved in the design of a
financial network. One benefit of
understanding these tradeoffs is that we
can then attempt to answer questions
such as whether financial institutions
should be closely interlinked or how




A necessary ingredient for
contagion is some sort of linkage among
firms (or investors). For example,
suppose that I plan to pay you next
month out of the money that I receive
from Dan. But what if Dan gets into
financial trouble and can’t pay me back?
In other words, what if Dan defaults? I
will not have the money to pay you, so I
will default as well. What’s more, if lots
of people were linked in this way, Dan’s
default could trigger not only my  Business Review  Q4  2002   19 www.phil.frb.org
default but also your default and the
defaults of many others in a domino
effect.
Researchers have studied
several examples of financial contagion.
Trade Credit. In a 1997
working paper, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and
John Moore took the idea in the
example above a bit further. In their
model, firms form links by giving trade
credit to one another. In other words,
firms that supply goods to other firms
agree to receive payments upon the
delivery of those goods (and not when
the order is made). In addition to
illustrating how such linkages may lead
to contagion, Kiyotaki and Moore also
showed that flexibility in carrying out
agreements does not necessarily promote
stability.
To understand how their
model works, consider the following:
There are three firms: Mandark Time
Dilators, Tom Swift Encyclotronics, and
Dexter Lab Supplies (Figure 1).
Mandark ordered 100 units of encyclo-
trons from Tom Swift. Mandark needs
these encyclotrons to produce time
dilators, so it is willing to pay $1 per unit.
Other firms don’t value encyclotrons as
much, so they will pay only 50 cents per
unit. Mandark does not have cash today
(when the order is placed), but it plans
to have the cash next month when the
goods are delivered. Thus, the contract
calls for payment upon delivery.
Swift, in turn, ordered 100
units of special tubes from Dexter. As
before, Swift needs these tubes for its
production process. Swift agrees to pay
$1 per tube, and payment is due next
month upon delivery. However, Swift
does not plan to have any cash of its
own next month. It intends to use the
$100 receivable from Mandark to pay
Dexter.
This arrangement usually
works well, but in some cases, it doesn’t.
Suppose, for example, that when we
reach the delivery date, Mandark finds
out that it has a temporary liquidity
problem — its profits turned out to be
lower than expected (after an eclipse of
the sun caused some unexpected delays
in the production of time dilators);
therefore, it has only $60 rather than the
anticipated $100. Suppose further that
the three firms aren’t well enough
known to be able to borrow against
future revenues. In other words,
Mandark cannot raise more money from
a bank today to pay Swift, according to
their initial agreement. Thus, it can buy
only 60 units, for a total of $60. This
means that Swift is left with 40 units of
encyclotrons.
Swift has two options. The first
is to keep the undelivered units and
wait until Mandark has the money (say,
in three weeks). Then it will sell the 40
units at $1 per unit. The second option is
to “liquidate” the remaining 40 units,
that is, sell them to another firm at a low
price of 50 cents per unit, for a total of
$20.
If Swift chooses the first option,
it will have $60 (rather than the
anticipated $100) to pay Dexter; hence,
it will buy only 60 tubes, for a total of
$60 (Figure 2). If Swift chooses the
second option, it will have $80 today —
$60 receivable from Mandark and $20
from liquidation of the remaining units.
Consequently, it will buy 80 units from
Dexter, for a total of $80 (Figure 3). In
both cases, Dexter will receive less than
the $100 it was supposed to get, so it may
develop a liquidity problem as well. In
other words, Mandark’s financial
problem can trigger financial problems at
both Swift and Dexter. If many firms are
linked in this way, a problem that
originates in Mandark can spread to
many firms in a contagious fashion.
But comparing Figures 2 and 3
illustrates another interesting point: You
might think that flexibility in carrying
out agreements — in our case Swift’s
giving Mandark some extra time to
make payments — would promote
stability. But in our example, the
opposite is true. If Swift chooses to
liquidate rather than reschedule
Mandark’s payments, Mandark’s initial
problem will have smaller effects on the
whole chain of firms because Swift
could buy 80 units from Dexter rather
than only 60.1  Of course, if all firms
could postpone payments, no problem
would arise. But it may be the case that
1 If there were more firms linked in this way
and each firm liquidated the undelivered
units, Dexter could buy 90 units from its
supplier, for a total of $90; Dexter’s supplier
could buy 95 units from its supplier for a total
of $95; and so on. Eventually, firms could buy
almost all of the goods they initially ordered.
FIGURE 1
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some firms along the chain must have
the cash (or most of it) today or that the
cost of postponing payments is too high
for some firms. If this is the case,
rescheduling payments may not be good
for the entire group of firms (or, more
generally, for the economy as a whole),
although it may be privately beneficial
for Mandark and Swift.
Interbank Deposits. The
article by Franklin Allen and Douglas
Gale demonstrates that linkages among
banks can also lead to contagion. Banks
often hold deposits with each other to
facilitate the clearing of checks and
other payments. Suppose, for example,
that Janeway Bancorp holds some
deposits in Picard Bancorp. When
Picard has liquidity problems because a
number of borrowers are temporarily
unable to make loan payments, its
depositors may become worried about its
financial strength and its ability to honor
agreements. In extreme cases, they may
all panic and “run” to the bank to
withdraw their money. Of course, the
bank does not have enough cash for
everyone. It can attempt to raise more
cash by selling assets or calling in loans
early, but if it does so, the bank will
receive less than full return. Thus, the
bank may not be able to raise enough
money to pay all of its depositors, so it
goes bankrupt, that is, it is closed by its
regulator.
How does Picard’s bankruptcy
affect Janeway? Janeway Bancorp has
many assets, some of which are the
deposits it holds with Picard. But if
Picard goes bankrupt, its uninsured
deposits may lose most of their value.
Therefore, Janeway may see a
significant decline in the value of its
assets. Like Picard’s depositors,
Janeway’s depositors may also become
worried and run to withdraw their
deposits, thereby creating a liquidity
problem for Janeway. If this liquidity
problem is very severe, Janeway may go
bankrupt and have to be closed as well.
More generally, if many banks are
linked to one another, the initial crisis at
Picard Bancorp may spread to other
banks.
Changes in Investors’
Wealth. Consider another example of
contagion. When I invest my money in
a stock issued by AlphaBeta
Corporation, I am essentially linked to
all other investors who buy that stock. If
some of these investors also have XYZ
Corporation’s stock in their portfolios, I
may become exposed to changes in the
price of XYZ, even though I do not hold
that stock directly in my portfolio.
To see why, suppose that the
price of XYZ declines because of some
change in that company’s expected
profits. Investors who hold XYZ’s stock
in their portfolios lose money — their
total wealth declines. As a result, they
may become more careful with their
FIGURE 3
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If many banks are linked to one another, the
initial crisis at [one bank] may spread to other
banks.  Business Review  Q4  2002   21 www.phil.frb.org
remaining money. Rather than investing
it in the stock market, they may decide
to invest in safer assets such as Treasury
bills. Or maybe they’ll just put their
money in savings accounts in a bank.
Thus, they may choose to sell XYZ’s as
well as other stocks they currently hold,
for example, AlphaBeta’s. This type of
behavior may lead to a decline in the
price of AlphaBeta’s stock.2 In other
words, the contagion may spread from
one stock to another. 3
Note that the argument above
does not require that the two firms,
AlphaBeta and XYZ, be in the same
industry. If this were the case, prices of
these two stocks could rise or fall
together simply because the two firms
are similar. Thus, one important insight
is that contagion may reduce the
benefits of portfolio diversification.4
Another scenario in which
changes in wealth can trigger contagion
is when a firm needs to post collateral in
order to borrow. Realizing that firms
don’t always pay back loans, lenders
usually require collateral. For example,
when a firm borrows in order to expand,
it has to post its physical assets (for
example, plant and equipment) as
collateral to secure the loan. However,
in an economic downturn, the value of
that collateral might fall, even when the
borrowing firm is doing well. Why? If
other firms are doing poorly and their
demand for new equipment decreases,
this decline in demand will cause prices
for all equipment to fall, including the
items posted as collateral. Since the
value of the borrower’s collateral has
gone down, it might not be able to
borrow as much as it originally planned,
and it may not be able to expand by
buying additional equipment. This, in
turn, can translate into an even stronger
decline in prices affecting even more
firms.5
THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL
NETWORKS: COMMITMENT VS.
SYSTEM FAILURE
All the examples in the
previous section describe financial
networks, a term that refers to the ways
in which banks, firms, and investors are
linked to one another through financial
commitments or financial markets.
Networks can arise in different
ways. Regulators often make rules that
affect the extent to which financial
institutions or investors are exposed to
one another’s problems. These rules can
indirectly affect which types of
networks develop. For example, by
imposing restrictions on cross-border
trade, regulators can make some links
infeasible, thus preventing the spread of
contagion from one country to another.
Regulators can also set margin
requirements for exchanges or capital
requirements for banks. Margin
requirements are cash or securities that
an investor must set aside as collateral to
make sure that he or she can honor a
commitment. Capital requirements
force banks to maintain a minimum
equity-to-debt ratio. In some cases, these
requirements may prevent a chain of
defaults: A trader who requires high
margins is less likely to be affected,
should one of its counterparties default.
Similarly, a bank with a large capital
cushion is less likely to fail, should its
deposits with another bank lose value.6
In many instances, networks
don’t just arise spontaneously; they are
designed. One example is a joint liability
arrangement in which every member of
a group is responsible for the others’
debts. The Grameen Bank uses such
arrangements to make unsecured loans
to people in Bangladesh.7 In this
arrangement, if one member of the
group defaults, she and other members
in her group are denied future loans.8
2 See the article by Albert Kyle and Wei
Xiong.
3  To learn more about the speed with which
contagion develops, see the article by Roger
Lagunoff and Stacey Schreft.
4 The argument in the previous paragraph can
also be used to show how crises can spread
across countries. If, for example, the two
stocks were traded in two different countries,
political instability in one country could
result in price declines of the stocks in both
countries.
 5 This point is developed in the article by
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore. They also
show that the crisis may even carry on to the
future. In other words, small liquidity
problems today can persist over time. The
basic idea is that lower levels of investments
today may translate to a decline in the value
of the firm’s assets in the future. This reduces
the firm’s ability to borrow in the future,
leading to a further reduction in investments
and a further decline in the value of the firm’s
assets.
When we choose between being linked and not
being linked, we need to weigh the benefits of
better insurance against the potential for the
whole group’s collapse.
6 One should be cautious, however, when
setting margin requirements. If margins are
adjusted daily, as in a futures exchange,
temporary liquidity problems may mean that
firms do not have enough cash to meet the
margin requirements. This by itself may
sometimes trigger contagion.
7 See the book by David Bornstein for more
information about Grameen Bank.
8 One explanation why these loans work is
that group members can impose additional
penalties on a defaulting member, thereby
encouraging her to take more care and pay
her loan. This is sometimes referred to as
social collateral. An alternative explanation
suggested by my own work is that joint
liability arrangements induce members of the
group to bail out other members who may
have difficulties repaying their loans.22   Q4  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Grameen Bank is not a public charity.
To make profits, it needs to carefully
design the loans. In particular, it may
need to come up with answers to
questions such as: How many members
should form a group? What factors
should be taken into account in
determining the group’s size?9
Networks can also arise from
the choice of production methods. In
the trade credit example, linkages
would not arise if each firm produced its
own inputs, rather than relying on other
firms.10
Linkages May Enhance
Commitment. When thinking about
how to design a network, one factor that
should be taken into account is that
linkages can affect firms’ ability to make
commitments.
Companies often enter finan-
cial contracts (for example, forwards,
futures, options, and swaps) for
insurance purposes. This is sometimes
referred to as hedging. One of the great
benefits of insurance is that it permits
the parties involved to undertake risky
(but promising) activities efficiently. For
example, suppose that I am uncertain
about the future profitability of the firm
I own. However, I know that it will
either face liquidity problems or have
more cash than it can use profitably.
Suppose also that the same is true of the
firm that you own. Both of us would
find it profitable to enter insurance
contracts that say: “I will give you cash
when I have plenty and you have
liquidity problems, and you will give me
cash when you have plenty and I have
liquidity problems.”11 If the uncertainty
about future profits resulted from some
new, promising project I was considering,
the inability to obtain insurance could
mean that I would not undertake the
project.
In some cases, however, it may
be difficult or even impossible to ensure
that anyone will actually honor such an
agreement. People can walk away from
agreements, hiding money or changing
accounting figures. Many times you
cannot do much about a broken
agreement, or it may not be worth your
time or money to go to court.
Another potential problem is
that it may be difficult for the contract-
ing parties to ascertain precisely how
much cash a firm can actually raise on
short notice. Thus, if you entered a
contract that says, “I will give you cash
when I have plenty and you have
liquidity problems,” the court would not
be able to enforce it. These are all
special cases of what economists call
lack of commitment — a person cannot
commit to pay even if he is able to.
Without some method for enforcing
commitments, companies simply won’t
sign such contracts, and everyone will
be worse off because of the loss of
insurance.
In a recent working paper, I
show that linkages can lead firms to
honor commitments that no contract
could enforce. Firms that have a lot of
cash (or a lot of liquid assets) will give
cash to firms that face liquidity
problems, not because of a formal
contractual commitment but because of
the threat of contagion. In other words,
cash-rich firms are willing to bail out
firms with financial problems to make
sure that these problems will not spread
to them. The idea is simple: If I bail you
out, I lose something because I give you
cash for free. On the other hand, if I
choose not to bail you out, I may lose
much more.
Consider, for example, the case
in which I rely on you to supply my firm
with an essential input.  Suppose further
that you have liquidity problems while I
have extra cash. I can choose one of two
options: either bail you out or not bail
you out. If I choose to bail you out, I lose
some money, say, $1 million, because I
am giving you cash that I could invest
elsewhere for a higher return. However,
if I choose not to bail you out, I may see
a decline of, say, $3 million in future
revenues because you did not provide
me with the essential part. This may
even drive me out of business. Obvi-
ously, I am better off bailing you out.
Note that when I’m forced to
bail you out, I — like any insurer forced
to pay a claim — will probably regret the
linkage that made the bailout necessary.
I may wish that I had spread my business
among many input suppliers, even those
that charged me more. Remember,
however, that the initial supply
arrangement was made at a time when
neither of us knew who would face
liquidity problems and who would have
extra cash. If we were both equally
9 Networks are also designed in payment
systems. See the paper by Xavier Freixas and
Bruno Parigi or my working paper.
10 Alfred Chandler’s account of large firms
taking over input suppliers and retail
distribution in the early 1920s provides an
example of a (nonfinancial) network designed
to reduce linkages. According to Chandler,
these firms became vertically integrated to
enhance coordination and to prevent delays
that would hold up the chain of production
and distribution.
11 This simple type of insurance contract is
seldom observed in real financial markets,
but an agreement like this underlies the
more complicated contracts we do observe,
such as options.
Firms that have a lot
of cash will give cash
to firms that face
liquidity problems,
not because of a
formal contractual
commitment but
because of the threat
of contagion.  Business Review  Q4  2002   23 www.phil.frb.org
likely to face problems, the mutual
exposure created by the exclusive supply
arrangement was a good idea for both of
us: Each expected the other to provide
insurance against the possibility of
liquidity problems. In other words, the
benefit of being linked is that it leads
each of us to bail out the other, just as if
we were able to commit to honor formal
insurance contracts.
But Linkages Also Promote
Contagion. Remember, however, that
linkages may lead the whole system to
collapse as problems at one firm spread
to others. In my working paper I
illustrate two general reasons the whole
financial network may collapse.
The first reason is obvious:
There may not be enough cash to carry
out the bailout. For example, suppose
that you need $1 million to cover your
financial problems. What if I only have
half a million dollars today? If we were
not linked to one another, my firm
would survive while your firm would go
bankrupt. But when we are linked to
one another, both your firm and mine
will go bankrupt.
The second reason, which is
not so obvious, is that there may be
enough cash to carry out a bailout, but it
is concentrated in the hands of very few
firms. Suppose, for example, that there
are six firms: five that have enough cash
to carry out their business and one with
significant liquidity problems. Now, take
an extreme case and suppose that only
one of those five firms has extra cash. If
that firm decides to handle the bailout
on its own, it will need to spend a lot,
say, $5 million. If the firm with extra
cash decides not to bail out the troubled
firm, it will be able to keep all its money
but may lose future revenues of, say, $3
million because of its linkage. In this
case, the threat of contagion is not
severe enough to compel the healthy
firm to carry out the bailout on its own;
therefore, all the firms will face the
negative consequences of contagion
(losing future profits and potentially
going out of business). On the other
hand, if wealth were spread more evenly
among the five healthy firms (for
example, if each of the five healthy
firms had $1 million to spare), a bailout
could occur and contagion would be
contained, since the cost of not bailing
out the firm would exceed the cost of
joining the bailout.
Network Design Involves
Tradeoffs.  As we can see from the
discussion above, when we choose
between being linked and not being
linked, we need to weigh the benefits of
better insurance against the potential for
the whole group’s collapse. Note that the
choice is not necessarily between having
everyone linked to everyone else or
having no one linked to anyone else.
Sometimes the best solution is to create
smaller groups of individuals who are
linked to one another. In the case of
loans made by Grameen Bank, groups
usually include five individuals.12
THE PROS AND CONS OF
BAILOUTS
So far we have seen how
contagion can happen (because of
linkages among firms and individuals)
and how the threat of contagion can
induce voluntary bailouts that may
prevent contagion. (That is, these same
linkages enhance commitment.) In
some cases, a bailout can succeed only if
many firms participate because any one
firm may not have enough cash for the
bailout or because one firm alone doesn’t
have the incentive to bail out another
because the cost to the firm is too high.
Participation by many firms
raises a new issue: All firms might
benefit if they could coordinate to bail
out a single firm in trouble, but acting in
concert can be difficult without some
formal organization. This may be
especially true if the number of firms
that need to coordinate their actions is
large. One reason coordination may be
unusually difficult is “free-riding.” Each
firm would like the other firms to do the
work. In other words, if other firms
participate, my participation may not be
crucial for the success of a bailout. So I
may decide to save money and not
participate. But if many firms reason this
way, coordination fails and the bailout
never takes place.
An Example of Successful
Coordination.  Both the difficulties of
coordination and the availability of
coordinating mechanisms are well
illustrated by the private-sector bailout
of Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM), in which the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York acted as coordinator.
LTCM, a prominent hedge fund,
suffered large losses and was on the
verge of bankruptcy after Russia
declared a debt moratorium on August
17, 1998. Throughout September,
LTCM tried to initiate an infusion of
funds from its bankers. Coordination
was necessary because any individual
bank that attempted to bail out LTCM
would simply be reducing the other
banks’ losses without providing enough
funds to solve the problem. One problem
that made coordination difficult was
that different banks had different levels
of exposure to LTCM. Herbert Allison,
then president of Merrill Lynch, was one
of the leaders in the effort to organize
the bailout. After analyzing the plan, he
advised the New York Fed’s Peter Fisher
that “the only way to get the banks
together was for the Fed to call them
and offer to hold a meeting.”13
12 In my working paper I present examples in
which the group size that best balances the
benefits of greater commitment and the
problems of increased risk of system failures is
small (say, three), for small economies (of,
say, 12 people), large economies (of, say, 12
billion people), or even infinitely large
economies.
13 As reported in Roger Lowenstein’s book, p.
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On September 22, Peter Fisher
contacted the 16 banks that were the
largest counterparties to LTCM and
organized an emergency meeting at the
New York Fed. On September 28, a
consortium of 14 commercial and
investment banks agreed to bail out
LTCM. The total amount was $3.6
billion, and the consortium of bankers
contributed all the money; the
government provided no funds or
guarantees. Some banks (those with
high exposure) contributed $300 million
each while other banks (those with low
exposure) contributed $100 million
each. Two banks (Citicorp and Bear
Stearns) declined to participate.
On October 1, 1998, in his
testimony before the House Committee
on Banking and Financial Services,
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan said: “Officials of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York facilitated
discussions in which the private parties
arrived at an agreement that both
served their mutual self-interest and
avoided possible serious market
dislocations.” He also said, “The Federal
Reserve provided its good offices to
LTCM’s creditors, not to protect
LTCM’s investors, creditors, or managers
from loss but to avoid the distortions to
market processes caused by a fire-sale
liquidation and the consequent
spreading of those distortions through
contagion.”
Bailouts May Undermine
Incentives to Be Careful. During that
same testimony, Chairman Greenspan
also acknowledged the problem of moral
hazard: “Of course, any time that there
is public involvement that softens the
blow of private-sector losses — even as
obliquely as in this episode — the issue
of moral hazard arises.” What does moral
hazard mean? Moral hazard usually
refers to high-risk activities in which an
insured person might choose to engage,
but that the insurer cannot monitor. For
example, if you have homeowners
insurance, you may be less careful about
locking the doors when you go out or
you might leave a fire unattended in
your fireplace. Similarly, if you thought
that you would always be bailed out,
you might choose to take excessive risks,
that is, risks that would not be
sanctioned by an insurer.
Does this mean that we should
try to avoid bailouts at all costs? The
answer is not necessarily. That would be
like saying that we should not be
allowed to get homeowners insurance.
However, incentives such as those
created by moral hazard are another
factor that must be taken into account
when designing financial networks.
SUMMARY
In this article, we have seen
how the ways in which firms are linked
to one another may trigger contagion.
We discussed the issue of an optimal
design for networks and showed that we
need to be careful not to fall into traps.
Things may not be as simple as they first
appear. The negative effects of
contagion may lead us to believe that
we should limit exposure between
financial institutions.
We have seen, however, that in
some cases such exposure may be good
for everyone despite and because of the
threat of contagion: The threat of
contagion enhances commitment. We
have also seen how bailouts may prevent
contagion, but they may require a
coordinator to bring them to fruition.
Like any form of insurance, bailouts may
create a moral hazard, but that does not
necessarily mean we should avoid them
at all costs. We should always think
about the tradeoffs.
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